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1. Introduction
Microfinance—defined as efforts to improve access to loans and to saving
services for poor people—may be the fastest-growing and most widely recognized new
anti-poverty tool. A survey of 200 of the thousands of microfinance organizations found
13 million loans worth $7 billion and 45 million savings accounts worth $19 billion
(Paxton, 1996). Growth will probably continue; for example, one movement seeks to
raise more than $20 billion to provide microfinance to 100 million of the poorest families
in the world by 2005 (Microcredit Summit, 1996).
The spark for microfinance is the story of the Grameen (Village) Bank of
Bangladesh. Founded in 1976, by 1997 Grameen had a portfolio of $260 million and 2.3
million members, most of them very poor, more than 90 percent of them women, and all
of them rural. More than 98 percent of payments due had been collected, and the
average disbursement in 1997 was $170, 60 percent of per-capita income. Unlike many
development projects in Bangladesh, Grameen has thrived through time and has
relieved some of the misery caused by floods and cyclones, corruption, purdah norms
that constrain women, and abysmal income and wealth.2
Microfinance caught fire worldwide. In Bangladesh, Grameen clones have more
than 2.5 million members. Transplants operate in the United States and Europe
(Conlin, 1998; Rogaly et al., 1999) as well as Africa, other parts of Asia, and Latin
America (Hulme, 1990; Thomas, 1995; Taub, 1998; Wall Street Journal, 1998).
Microfinance spread quickly across the globe because few other tools promise to
fight poverty as effectively (Morduch, 1999a). But does microfinance really work? And
if microfinance does work, then is it so effective that it should crowd out other types of
development interventions (Rogaly, 1996)? After all, the poor benefit not only from
better financial services but also, for example, from better food, water, roads, or shelter.
As it turns out, no one knows whether Grameen—let alone microfinance in
general—has been cost-effective. Past attempts to measure the social costs of Grameen
have flaws (Benjamin, 1994; Hashemi, 1997; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Khandker et al.,
1995; Morduch, 1999b; Yaron et al., 1997). Some count cash grants as revenue, some
fail to impute an opportunity cost to all resources, and all fail to discount cash flows
through time. Likewise, past attempts to measure the social benefits of Grameen have
weaknesses (Hossain, 1988; Khandker, 1998 and 1996; Khandker et al., 1998; Latif,
1994; McKernan, forthcoming; Morduch, 1998; Nanda, 1999; Pitt et al., 1999; Pitt and
Khandker, 1998; Schuler et al., 1997). Some fail to control for what would have
happened even without Grameen, some fail to control for participant self-selection or
for non-random placement of branches, and all fail to measure more than a few of the3
multiple aspects of social benefits. These shortfalls result not from a lack of competence
or effort but rather from the difficulty of the measurement of impact.
Has Grameen been a good social investment? If Grameen, one of the best
microfinance organizations, has not been a good social investment, then most other
microfinance organizations—and microfinance in general—might not be as useful as
many have hoped.
This paper performs a cost-effectiveness analysis, comparing Grameen’s outputs
with its social costs in a standard present-value framework. Cost-effectiveness analysis
is used because outputs are much simpler to measure than benefits. Social costs are
taken as the present value of cash flows between public entities and Grameen.
From the point of view of a social investor from 1983-97, Grameen produced a
person-year of membership at a cost of about $20. Likewise, Grameen produced a
dollar-year of borrowed purchasing power at a cost of about $0.22. Most evidence in the
literature suggests that social benefits (not measure in this paper) exceed these
estimates of social costs. Thus, Grameen has probably been a good social investment.
The results apply only to Grameen; other microfinance organizations—and microfinance
in general—may or may not be as cost-effective.
Section 2 below outlines how Grameen works. Sections 3 and 4 present
frameworks to measure the social benefits and social costs of microfinance. Section 5
discusses implications for Grameen and for the microfinance movement as a whole.1 All monetary figures are in dollars as of December 1998.
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2. How Grameen works
Now this is how the birth of Grameen came about (Yunus, 1998). A young
academic with a freshly minted PhD in economics from the United States had returned
to Chittagong University to help to build his newly created country but grew frustrated
with abstract theory as he watched people starve during the famine of 1974. One day in
his quest to find a way to help, he met a bamboo weaver who, for want of less than $1,
was enthralled to a moneylender. From his own pocket, the professor lent an average of
$0.64 to the weaver and to 41 others. By 1976, Grameen was born. When Grameen
became a bank in 1983, it had 36,000 members and a portfolio of $3.1 million.
1 By 1997,
it had 2.3 million members and a portfolio of $260 million.
Behind the miracle story lies the design of products and incentives that allow
Grameen to make small loans to poor people without physical assets for collateral. This
section describes the design details that enabled the tale of success.
2.1 Membership
New members are placed in groups of five, with five to eight groups forming a
centre. All members in the centre meet with a loan officer weekly. For the first few
weeks, they learn about Grameen, save $0.02 a week, learn to sign their names, and2 In December 1998, 1 dollar was worth 48.5 taka.
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memorize a set of vows to self-improvement. Each group elects a chair, and each centre
elects a chief. New members must also buy a share of stock in Grameen for $2.
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2.2 Loans
Lenders seek to manage default risk; all borrowers promise to repay, but,
whether due to choice or to constraint, some break their promise. To control risk, most
lenders require collateral, an asset that the borrower loses upon default and that thus
motivates repayment. Most formal lenders require assets such as land or houses. The
poor, however, either do not have such assets or cannot afford to lose them.
The innovation of Grameen—and of microfinance in general—is to collateralize
the asset of future access to loans. Microfinance in the South works a lot like credit
cards in the North; borrowers repay because they want to preserve their future access
to loans.
Although Grameen did not invent the threat of termination as an incentive to
fulfill contracts (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983), it did popularize its combination with a
second design element: default by one group member leads to loss of access for all
members. This joint liability reduces risk in three ways (Conning, 1998). First, it gives
members a self-interesed reason to exclude members who are known to be bad risks.
Knowledge of individual character is costly to outsiders but is often a sunk cost for
villagers. Thus, joint liability can cut the cost to screen potential borrowers. Second,6
members have an incentive to make sure that their fellows do not squander their loans.
This can cut the cost to monitor active borrowers. Third, members have a reason to
coax comrades out of arrears or even to repay their debts for them. Members may also
act as mentors for each other. This can cut the cost to enforce repayment. On the
downside, joint liability may lead to domino effects in which borrowers who would have
repaid choose instead to default because they would lose access anyway due to the
default of others (Besley and Coate, 1995; Paxton et al., 2000). Also, joint liability may
not cut costs but rather only shift them from lenders to borrowers.
Because joint liability lets the poor bank on social capital, it has captured the
imagination of the public (Zwingle, 1998). Because joint liability involves repeated
games between heterogeneous agents with imperfect information, it has drawn attention
from theoretical economists (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). At Grameen, however, joint
liability is more subtle than the popular perception and more complex than the theory.
First, Grameen staggers disbursements to leverage the threat of termination.
Two members get loans first, then two more members get loans one month later. After
one more month, the last member gets a loan. Because most loans last exactly one
year, staggered disbursement reduces the risk of domino default because some
borrowers must finish repayment before they know whether their comrades will default.
Furthermore, borrowers who have already paid most of their debt have incentives to
make sure that their peers also repay.7
Second, loan officers often do not enforce joint liability at the group level. They
tend to bend the rules both because they know that some arrears are involuntary and
because they are reluctant to kick out good borrowers. To enforce repayment without
strict joint liability at the group level, loan officers use social pressure at the centre
level. For example, they may suspend all disbursements at a centre until all debts are
up-to-date. They may also scold women or detain them in the centre longer than
normal. In Bangladesh, this shames women and may subject them to the wrath of their
husbands when they finally are released (Ito, 1998; Rahman, 1999).
Third, Grameen implicitly promises bigger loans through time. New borrowers
get very small loans, but loan size usually grows as they prove their creditworthiness.
Most borrowers get a new loan as soon as they finish repayment on their old one.
Fourth and finally, Grameen promises more attractive types of loans to the best
borrowers. The most common type of loan is the ‘general’ loan, but since 1984,
Grameen has also made ‘housing’ loans with bigger disbursements, longer terms, and
lower interest rates. Recently, Grameen started to make loans for college expenses and
cell phones. Grameen even makes individual loans (Dowla, 1998). Access to these loans
are worth a lot to borrowers, so the centres—and especially the centre chiefs—try to
maintain a clean record.8
2.3 Forced savings
Unlike most microfinance organizations, Grameen takes deposits. Saving is,
however, compulsory, and some types of withdrawals are restricted. Saving in Grameen
resemble insurance; members can borrow against their savings in emergencies, and
Grameen can tap them in the case of default.
Grameen has four types of forced savings (Morduch, 1999c). The first two types
are called ‘savings’, but they are really fees that members will never get back. After
their first loan, members must pay 2 cents each week for schools run by the centre.
They must also pay 0.5 percent of disbursements in excess of $20 into a fund used to
cover losses from default.
The last two types of forced savings are real savings. Members must deposit four
cents each week into ‘personal savings’. Interest accrues at 8.5 percent, and
withdrawals are unrestricted. In addition, 5 percent of each disbursement goes to the
‘group fund’. Modelled on informal group funds (Ardener and Burman, 1995;
Rutherford, 2000), it earns 8.5 percent and is supposed to be controlled by the centre
and used for emergency loans to members. In practice, loan officers often control the
fund, and they use it to insure Grameen against default (Matin, 1997). Grameen also
makes loans from the ‘group fund’ after floods. Members cannot withdraw from the
‘group fund’ until they leave Grameen or until they have ten years of membership.9
In sum, most ‘savings’ resemble fees for insurance or for loan-loss reserves. As
members approach ten years of membership, however, the chance to withdraw what has
grown to be a large sum is a strong incentive to continue to repay as promised.
Voluntary savings from members are small. This is unfortunate; to escape from
poverty means to build assets. Although some people can build assets through debt,
even more can build assets through savings. Some of the poor are creditworthy, but all
are depositworthy. Grameen probably could improve its attempts to relieve poverty if it
also had flexible, voluntary savings services decoupled from debt (Rutherford, 1998).
2.4 Non-financial products
Grameen aims to change the social and economic structure of rural Bangladesh.
To do this, it supplies, in addition to loans, what it calls discipline (Khandker, et al.,
1995). This is not only financial discipline to make repayments and deposits each week,
but also physical discipline: members must sit in straight rows, salute, chant, and
sometimes do calisthenics (Hashemi, 1997).
The vows that members recite also instill discipline in that they foster a break
from the social norms that help to perpetuate misery in rural Bangladesh. For example,
the resolutions praise small families, prohibit dowry and child marriage, promote
gardens, extol education, and exhort members to drink clean water and to use latrines.
Perhaps the most important non-financial service of Grameen is social
intermediation (Barton and Edgcomb, 1998). In essence, this produces social capital as10
a by-product of meeting once a week. In rural Bangladesh, social capital is scarce
because the custom of purdah isolates women from men and from markets. Grameen
provides a socially accepted excuse to gather and to talk. The impacts are both
psychological and economic; not only do women feel less isolated, but they also
strengthen their support networks (Larance, 1998).11
3. A framework to measure social benefits
What are the social benefits of the services just described? This section lays out
a framework that integrates six linked (but distinct) aspects of social benefits: worth to
users, cost to users, depth, breadth, length, and scope. Because worth, cost, and depth
are difficult to measure, I adjust the framework to use only measurements of outputs.
The general framework is useful for evaluation beyond microfinance.
3.1 Six aspects of social benefits
3.1.1 Worth to users
Worth to users is defined as their willingness to pay. This does not suppose that
users can pay nor that they should pay. Rather, it supposes that a change in well-being
due to microfinance can be expressed in dollar-equivalent terms. For example, if a
woman were willing to bear costs of $50 to be a member of Grameen for a year, then
she would be just as well off with $50 more income as with a costless year of
membership. Worth is a simple concept, but it is very difficult to measure. The
literature on Grameen does not contain any complete measure of worth to users.
3.1.2 Cost to users
Cost to users is defined as the sum of price costs and transaction costs. Price
costs are direct cash payments to a microfinance organization. Price costs borne by
users are revenue for the organization.12
Transaction costs are non-price costs. They include both non-cash opportunity
costs—such as the time to meet each week—and indirect cash expenses for such things
as transport and documents linked to the use of microfinance. Transaction costs often
swamp price costs (Bhatt and Tang, 1998). Transaction costs borne by users are not
revenue for the microfinance organization.
The concepts of cost to users, cost of supply, and cost to society are distinct.
Cost of supply is the opportunity cost of the resources used in production. Cost to
society encompasses cost to users, cost of supply, and any other costs to non-users.
3.1.2.1 Estimates of costs to users of Grameen
Transaction costs can be estimated from survey data on the miles, minutes, and
money involved in the use of microfinance. No one has estimated the transaction costs
incurred in the use of Grameen.
Price costs are best estimated not as the nominal stated interest rate but rather
as the real effective interest rate, defined as the annualized, inflation-adjusted discount
rate such that the cash flows from the use of microfinance have a present value of zero.
To estimate this for a typical borrower of Grameen requires several assumptions. First,
inflation is 5 percent, the average in Bangladesh in 1988-97 (Table 1). Second, the
member buys a share for 100 taka when she joins, and gets her first loan four weeks
later. Third, she gets 10 ‘general’ loans, each with an annual nominal stated interest
rate of 20 percent (14 percent in real terms) and 52 equal installments that start one13
week after disbursement. Fourth, the first loan is for 1,000 taka, and each subsequent
loan increases by 1,500 taka. Fifth, the borrower makes all payments on time, makes no
withdrawals from ‘personal savings’, and does not borrow from the ‘group fund’.
Seventh, the borrower leaves Grameen after ten years, sells her share, and withdraws
the $150 accumulated in ‘personal savings’ and in the ‘group fund’.
Given this, the present value of cash flows is zero when the weekly discount rate
is 0.00711. The real effective interest rate is (52·0.007110.05)/(1+0.05)  30 percent.
Forced savings makes the real effective rate more than twice the real stated rate.
The accounting treatment of forced savings also affects Grameen’s reported
profits. Grameen counts cash inflows from all types of forced savings as increases in
liabilities. If the non-reimbursable fees were correctly counted as revenue, then revenues
and reported profits would increase even though cash flows for users would not change.
Why doesn’t Grameen do this? Grameen probably wants to hide costs to users
and to post low profits. Low interest rates differentiate Grameen from moneylenders.
Furthermore, large profits might prompt the government to collect taxes and donors to
ask whether the poor bear too much cost. The current structure provides strong cash
flows without the appearance of excessive profits or high stated interest rates.14
3.1.2.2 Net gain to users
Net gain to users is defined as worth minus cost, the change in well-being due to
microfinance. Net gain is like consumer surplus in welfare theory, the difference between
the highest cost that a user would agree to bear and the cost actually borne.
People join Grameen because they expect positive net gains. Although the size of
net gain is unknown (because benefits are unmeasured), its sign can be inferred; if
members do not drop out, then net gain must be positive. The annual drop-out rate at
Grameen in 1986-94 was about 5 percent (Khandker et al., 1995). This suggests that
most members had positive net gains.
3.1.3 Depth
Depth is defined as the social value of net gains that accrue to a given user. In
welfare theory, depth is the weight of a user in the social-welfare function. If society has
a preference for the poor, then poverty is a good proxy for depth.
In principle, only people in households with less than half an acre of land or with
assets worth less than an acre of land can join Grameen. In practice, some new
members exceed this limit (Matin, 1998). Most members are still very poor women.
3.1.4 Breadth
Breadth is defined as the number of users. Breadth matters because the poor are
many but the development dollars are few. With more than 2.3 million members and
centres in more than half the villages in Bangladesh, Grameen has extensive breadth. 15
3.1.5 Length
Length is defined as the time frame of the supply of microfinance. Length
matters because society cares about the well-being of the poor both now and in the
future. A common proxy for length is the ability to attract grants or soft loans or, in
the absence of perpetual subsidies, the ability to earn enough profit to maintain the real
value of equity (Schreiner and Yaron, 2001).
In 1997, Grameen reported a before-tax profit of $0.3 million. Without subsidies,
losses would have been $23 million, and the sum of losses since 1983 would have been
$183 million (Section 4 below). But Grameen does get subsidies, and it will continue to
do so. Even if Grameen lost its subsidies, it probably could make the adjustments
needed to survive long into the future.
3.1.6 Scope
Scope is defined as the number of types of services supplied. For example, a
microfinance organization that offers both loans and savings services has greater scope
than one that offers only loans. Scope also increases with the variety and flexibility of
the terms of financial contracts.
Grameen has great scope in some ways and weak scope in others. Grameen does
supply savings services, but almost all savings are forced, and withdrawal is restricted.
For loans, the amount disbursed increases with time, and Grameen has invented new16
types of loans to complement the ‘general’ loan. For a given type of loan, however,
most terms are the same for all borrowers.
3.2 Benefit-cost analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis
As defined above, depth is the social value of net gain, or worth to users minus
cost to users. Breadth is number of users, length is years of service, and scope is
number of types of services. Next, the paper combines these six aspects in a formula
that, in principle, could be used to measure the social benefits of microfinance.
Let t index length in years from 1 to T. Let st index scope as the number of
types of services in year t from 1 to St. For a given service st in year t, let breadth be
Nts, with each user indexed by nts. Let the worth in year t of product st to user nts be
wtsn, and let the cost be ctsn. Net gain is then wtsnctsn.
The depth function Dtsn(wtsnctsn) gives the social value of the net gain from
contract st for client nst in year t. The general social-welfare function W() aggregates
net gains across users, services, and time:
Social benefit  b  W[D111(w111c111), ... ,DTSTNTST
(wTSTNTST
cTSTNTST
)]. (1)3 Of course, it may not always make sense to sum diverse types of outputs.
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Given a discount factor  and the assumption that W() is additively separable
across users, services,
3 and time, social benefits b is:










Benefit-cost analysis compares social costs c (Section 4 below) with social
benefits b. If b > c, then a project passes the benefit-cost test and is deemed a good
social investment. The test requires knowledge of worth to users wtsn, cost to users ctsn,
and the social value of net gains Dtsn(). Most analyses will not have this knowledge.
As an alternative, cost-effectiveness analysis compares social costs not with
benefits but with outputs. Given that otsn is the number of outputs of type st for user nts
in year t, cost-effectiveness replaces the measurement of social benefits b with the
measurement of outputs :










Most analyses consider only one service, so St = 1 for all t. Also, most projects
have data on annual output but not on output for each user. If Ot is total output of one
type of service in a year, then (3) is:




Define ¯ b = b/ as (unmeasured) social benefit per unit of output, and define ¯ c =
c/ as (measured) social cost per unit of output. Dividing the benefit-cost criterion b >
c by  gives the cost-effectiveness criterion, ¯ b > ¯ c. A project is deemed cost-effective if
unmeasured average social benefits ¯ b are judged to exceed measured average social
costs ¯ c.
Why bother with this algebraic rearrangement? After all, knowledge of average
social costs does not confer knowledge of average social benefits. In the imperfect world
of policy, however, criteria based on averages may be useful because often people can
think about averages more easily than about aggregates. Furthermore, if average social
costs are very high or very low, then policymakers may feel confident enough to judge
whether unmeasured average social benefits exceed average social costs.
3.3 Discounted output of Grameen, 1983-97
Social costs c are estimated in Section 4. Here, the output  produced by
Grameen in 1983-97 is estimated.
 The discount factor  = 1/(1+r), is the intertemporal social price. The choice of
the social discount rate r is one of the most-debated issues in policy analysis. In
practice, the two biggest entities that do project analyses—the World Bank and the US
government—set r at 10 percent per year in real terms (Belli, 1996; US Office of
Management and Budget, 1972). This is arbitrary, but with a fixed budget, its19
consistent use leads to the correct choice of projects. Furthermore, funds seem to run
out before projects whose benefits exceed costs at r = 0.10 (Quirk and Terasawa, 1991).
Of all the outputs of Grameen, this paper focuses on only two: person-years of
membership and dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power. Membership confers access
to all other services and so in some sense encompasses all of them. Dollar-years of
borrowed purchasing power is the best summary of loan size because it accounts for the
amount disbursed, the term to maturity, and the repayment pattern.
In a given year, the raw number of person-years of membership is the average
number of members, and the raw number of dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power
is the average net loan portfolio. It is more complex to discount these average stocks
than to discount flows. Grameen, like most microfinance organizations, reports stocks
only at the start (st1) and end of a year (st). With linear change assumed, the daily
average discount-weighted stock is not 
t0.5(stst1)/2 because the discount is a non-
linear function of time. It turns out that:













For r = 0.10 in 1983-97, Grameen produced 5.4 million discounted person-years
of membership (line Eo in Table 5). Likewise, it produced 0.5 billion discounted dollar-
years of borrowed purchasing power (line En). Is this a lot of output or a little? It
depends on the social cost of its production.21
4. A framework to measure social costs
Social cost is the sum of discounted cash flows from public entities to Grameen
minus discounted cash flows from Grameen back to public entities, supposing that
Grameen was founded in 1983 and liquidated in 1997. Past work uses ad hoc
frameworks that do not discount.
If a microfinance organization is publicly owned, then social cost c is the equity
E0 that public entities put in the organization at time 0, plus the discounted net flows
of funds FFt from public entities and to organization in year t, minus the discounted
equity ET that public entities get back from the organization at time T:
Social cost  c  E0  
T
t1
tFFt  TET. (6)
Measurement of E0 and ET is simple; the rest of this section describes how to
measure FFt.
4.1 Cash flows with public and private entities
The formula for social cost excludes all cash flows with private entities. Private
entities are assumed to do their own cost-effectiveness analysis for whether a trade
gives them net gains. The measure of social cost here ignores all private trades because
they have, at worst, a social net gain of zero. It also assumes away all externalities.4 For 1984-85, 1988-93, and 1996-97, financial statements come from the annual
reports of Grameen. Data for the rest of the years come from Morduch (1999c),
Hashemi (1997), and Khandker et al. (1995). Data for 1976-82 are unavailable. To
convert stocks in nominal taka to constant dollars, the analysis multiplies nominal taka
at time t by the consumer price index in Bangladesh as of 31 Dec 1998. It then divides
by the consumer price index as of time t and multiplies by 1/48.5, the exchange rate
between dollars and taka on 31 Dec 1998. Conversion of flows accounts for the fact that
flows take place constantly even though only their sum is reported at year-end (Author,
1997).
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In contrast, funds allotted by public entities belong to society. The price charged
is not only set outside the market but may also lack any link to the social worth of
funds in alternative uses. Cost-effectiveness analysis is useful to check the choices made
by public servants who do not bear most of the consequences of their choices.
Public entities are funded involuntarily by taxpayers; private entities are funded
voluntarily. Grameen has public funds because it sold stocks and bonds to the
government of Bangladesh. Likewise, Grameen borrowed from the International Fund
for Agricultural Development and from Norway and Sweden. Grameen also has private
funds: debt from the Ford Foundation, and funds that came from Grameen members.
4.2 Financial statements
The cash flows of Grameen are derived from its financial statements.
4 This is23
problematic because accounting logic is seldom economic logic. To complicate matters,
Grameen—like most other microfinance organizations—does not use generally accepted
accounting principles. The adjustments below aim to remove most of the effects of this.
4.2.1 The accounting treatment of grants
Grameen treats some grants as liabilities. These funds, however, are really
equity because they do not accrue interest and will not be paid back. The adjusted
financial statements (Tables 2, 3, and 4), count these so-called liabilities as part of
equity grants EGt (line Di in Table 4). Equity grants are the vast bulk of net worth.
Grameen also counts some grants as revenue (RGt, line Bp in Table 2). Because
grants do not result from business operations, they are not revenue and should be
counted as additions to equity. Counting grants as revenue inflates profit and blurs the
picture of business performance.
4.2.2 Discounts on expenses
Almost all microfinance organizations receive some grants in kind. Common
examples are fixed assets (land or computers) or services (technical assistance or debt
guarantees). Free services are discounts on expenses (DXt). They should be accounted
for with two entries: an addition to equity (equal to the market value of the service),
and an equal expense. Few organizations do this, however, and this inflates profits.
Grameen is exempt from reserve requirements on deposits; this is a discount on
expenses because it reduces the cost of funds. The annual reports also hint at other5 Provisions are estimates of the loans that, although good now, will someday go
bad. Data on cumulative disbursements and repayments for ‘general’ loans suggest
that, as widely reported, Grameen has collected about 98 percent of funds disbursed
and due. At the end of 1997, ‘general’ loans were 83 percent of the portfolio, and
‘housing’ loans were the bulk of the remainder. Because Grameen makes provisions at 5
percent of disbursements for ‘housing’ loans, provisions as a share of total
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unquantified discounts. This paper assumes that discounts on expenses for Grameen are
zero in all years (line Bu of Table 2).
4.2.3 Expenses for provisions for loan losses
Most banks recognize an expense for expected defaults as they make
disbursements. This reflects the belief that loan losses are due not to weak enforcement
but rather to weak screening. Thus standard practice is to charge an expense for
expected loan losses not to the year when a loan turned sour but rather to the year
when it was disbursed.
Grameen adjusts provisions for loan losses up or down each year to ensure a
small reported profit. On net through time, it provisioned too little; $20 million in the
reported net portfolio of $260 million at the end of 1997 probably will not be collected
and yet did not have provisions.
This paper adjusts provisions so that the loan-loss reserve is always 5 percent of
the gross loan portfolio (lines Cb and Cc of Table 3).
5 The adjustments include a write-disbursements should be (10.98)0.83+0.050.17  0.025. Because ‘general’ loans have
one-year terms, the amount disbursed in a year is about twice the balance outstanding.
If ‘housing’ loans also had one-year terms, then provisions as a share of the balance
outstanding would be twice provisions as a share of disbursements, or 5 percent. In
fact, ‘housing’ loans have longer terms, so the balance outstanding is less than twice
disbursement. In most years, however, Grameen has grown, and growth tends to make
disbursements exceed twice the balance outstanding. Thus, 5 percent is a reasonable
estimate of proper provisions as a share of balance outstanding.
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off each year of an amount equal to the provision expense in the previous year. The
small reported profits become big losses in 1983-94 and big profits in 1995-97.
4.3 Other adjustments
4.3.1 Discount on public debt
The discount on public debt is defined as the savings that result from borrowing
from a public source rather than from a private source. The discount is Dt(mtct),
where Dt is average public debt, ct is the average interest rate paid for public debt, and
mt is the market interest rate for private debt of like risk. The market rate mt always
exceeds the public rate ct; if not, the organization would not bother with public debt.
The discount on public debt needlessly corrupts reported profits; with a cash equity
grant of Dt(mtct), an organization could pay for private debt, have the same net cash
flows, and yet not depress interest expenses.6 The algorithm comes from Benjamin (1994). It is assumed that Grameen would
not replace public debt with deposits from members.
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The choice of the market interest rate m is as difficult as the choice of the social
discount rate r. For Grameen, the cost of private debt in a free market in unknown
because the government fixes the market rate at 14 percent and because the default risk
of Grameen is unknown. To estimate m, this paper adjusts the prime rate for estimated
risk.
6 On average in 1983-97, this risk-adjusted rate was 17 percent per year in nominal
terms.
Like most other microfinance organizations, Grameen has a lot of public debt. In
1997, Grameen paid 5 percent for an average public debt of $187 million; the implied
discount was $23 million (lines Fa-Fd of Table 6). The undiscounted sum of discounts
on public debt through in 1983-97 was $152 million.
4.3.2 True Profit
True profit (TPt) is defined as what reported profits Pt would be if the
organization counted grants as additions to equity rather than as revenue grants RGt,
discounts on public debt Dt(mtct), and discounts on expenses DXt:
True profitt  TPt  Pt  [RGt  Dt(mtct)  DXt]. (7)
True profit for Grameen is smaller than reported profit, mostly due to discounts
on public debt. For example, reported profit in 1997 was $0.3 million, but true profit
was -$23 million (line Fh of Table 6).27
4.3.3 Ownership of shares
Most microfinance organizations are not-for-profits that do not sell shares nor
have formal owners. Grameen does have shareholders, both public (the Bangladesh
government) and private (members). This affects the cash flows that are assumed to
come back to public entities at the end of the time frame because private entities will
have a legal claim on some share of equity at liquidation.
Public paid-in capital (PCpubt) is the stock of paid-in capital from public entities
at time t, and private paid-in capital (PCprit) is defined likewise. Public entities at time
t have a legal claim on a share t of equity, where t = PCpubt / (PCpubt + PCprit).
The government of Bangladesh bought all of the first issue of Grameen shares in
1983 (line Fi of Table 6). All subsequent sales have been to members. By 1997,  was
0.07, and equity was $84 million. If Grameen were liquidated, the government would
receive $6 million, and the 2.3 million members would pocket $78 million, or $34 each.
A $2 share bought in 1987 would have earned a nominal annual return of 33 percent.
This handsome return is due to subsidies from public entities that bolstered equity but
that then became the legal property of private shareholders.
4.3.4 Dividends and taxes
Unlike Grameen, some of the other top microfinance organizations have paid
dividends, so the framework includes this possibility. The paper assumes that dividends
Divt are distributed throughout the year and that public entities get a share t.28
Taxes are cash flows back to public entities. Until September 1996, Grameen
was tax-exempt. In 1997, Grameen made provisions for tax on reported profits at the
standard corporate rate of 40 percent. Of course, taxes are one more reason for
Grameen to keep reported profits low.
4.4 The social cost of Grameen, 1983-97
Social cost is measured as discounted cash flows from public entities minus
discounted cash flows back to public entities. The first outflow is the share of equity at
time 0 that comes from public entities, 
00E0 = 0E0.
Net flows of funds FFt are the sum of the change in equity grants EGt, public
paid-in capital PCpubt, revenue grants RGt, discounts on public debt Dt(mtct), and
discounts on expenses DXt, minus the public share of dividends tDivt and taxes:
FFt  EGtPCpubtRGtDt(mtct)DXttDivtTaxt. (8)
This accumulated annual flow is discounted by t
* (Author, 1997).
At the end of the time frame, public entities get an inflow of TET. Total social
cost is then discounted outflows minus discounted inflows:





t FFt  TTET. (9)
Assuming E0 = 0, the social cost of Grameen for 1983-97 was $107 million (Line
Fl in Table 6). To judge whether this is high or low requires a comparison with output.29
5. Results and discussion
Was Grameen cost-effective? From 1983-97, it used $107 million to produce 5.4
million discounted person-years of membership, so the per-unit social cost was about
$20 (line Fm of Table 6). This means that if members, on average in each year, were
willing to bear at least $20 more cost than what they did in fact bear, then Grameen
was a good social investment.
In terms of dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power, Grameen produced 0.5
billion discounted units, so the per-unit social cost was about $0.22 (line Fn of Table 6).
These results are robust to the assumed social discount rate r and market interest rate
m (Table 7).
Was Grameen worthwhile? The cost-effectiveness criterion requires that social
benefits per unit of output ¯ b exceed social costs per unit of output ¯ c. Although this
paper has not estimated social benefits, the preponderance of the many imperfect and
incomplete attempts to measure benefits strongly suggests that social benefits did
indeed exceed this estimate of average costs.
5.1 Evidence of benefits of Grameen
At the most basic level, low drop-out rates signal that average social benefits
were positive. Of course, a positive sign on average net gain is necessary but not
sufficient for the size of average net gain to exceed average costs.7 Empowerment is not costless; husbands sometimes beat their wives over
conflicts related with Grameen (Rahman, 1999; Schuler et al., 1998).
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Several qualitative studies find that Grameen and/or its clones empower women
(Amin et al., 1998; Hashemi et al., 1996). Larance (1998) finds that the weekly
meetings help women to strengthen support networks beyond their kin groups. They
also offer women a chance to gather in public and to hear their first names spoken with
respect.
7 ‘These findings suggest that the social implications of microcredit lending can
be as powerful as—or even more powerful than—the economic implications’ (Larance,
1998, p. 30). Both types of impacts are real and important even though both types
remain unmeasured, at least in terms that can be directly compared with costs.
Other work finds that Grameen increases contraception (Schuler et al., 1994).
Although Grameen does not supply family-planning services, its members do vow to
keep their families small, and loan officers may prefer members with few children
because they believe that children increase default risk. Increased contraception has
social benefits, albeit unquantified and perhaps unquantifiable. Still, the gains are
probably smaller than claimed; Schuler et al. (1994) do not control for non-random
placement of branches nor for self-selection by participants. Pitt and Khandker (1996)
do control for these factors, and they find that Grameen does not affect contraception.
In the economic sphere, the first study to use a control group (Hossain, 1998)
found that membership in Grameen increased annual household income by 43 percent.31
Pitt and Khandker (1998) used different data and controlled for unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual, household, and village levels. They found that annual
household expenditure increased by $18 for each additional $100 of cumulative
disbursement. If this effect persists through time and if the average effect exceeds the
marginal effect, then the average increase in household expenditure by itself would
provide at least $0.09 to balance the average social cost of $0.22 per dollar-year of
borrowed purchasing power.
Pitt and Khandker (1998) also found that non-land assets of women increased by
$27 for each additional $100 of cumulative disbursement. Furthermore, a 1 percent
increase in cumulative disbursement to a woman increased the likelihood of school
attendance by 0.028 for boys and by 0.019 for girls. These benefits, big as they may be,
are not in flow units and so are not directly comparable to measures of average cost.
Morduch (1998) points out a flaw in Pitt and Khandker (1998); no controls own
more than half an acre of land even though many new members of Grameen do. To
correct this, Morduch drops from the sample all Grameen households with more than
half an acre. He also replaces Pitt and Khandker’s complex weighted exogenous
sampling maximum likelihood/limited information maximum likelihood/fixed effects
estimator with a simple difference-in-differences estimator. Finally, Morduch estimates
the effects not of borrowing but of eligibility to borrow. The impacts found by Pitt and
Khandker disappear. Morduch finds that access did, however, help to smooth32
consumption and labour supply across seasons. This makes sense; loans help households
to diversify activities, and Grameen also supplies implicit insurance. For subsistence
households, a better buffer between them and hunger can be very valuable.
Khandker et al. (1998) use the data of Pitt and Khandker to find that the
presence of a Grameen branch in a village increases the average wage by 14 percent
and production per household by 50 percent.
McKernan (forthcoming) also uses this data and finds that participation in
Grameen increases average profits from self-employment from about $45 per month to
about $90 per month. Average monthly income for a four-person household in the
sample is about $73, so this is a very large effect. These benefits alone would more than
compensate for the social costs of supply.
Finally, Nanda (1999) uses the Pitt and Khandker data to find that Grameen
increases the demand of women for formal health care. Indeed, Nanda claims that a
given investment in microcredit has the same effect on the usage of formal health care
as that same investment would have if used to establish of health clinics.
Each of these measurements of social benefits has weaknesses. If any one of them
were correct, however, then social benefits probably exceed social costs. Although the
true effects may be smaller than the biggest estimates, it is hard to imagine how
impacts could not be positive in all these areas. This paper concludes that Grameen33
was probably a cost-effective social investment. The goal has been to make explicit the
logic and assumptions that support this judgement so that future work can improve it.
5.2 Implications for microfinance as a whole
What does the probable cost-effectiveness of Grameen mean for the worldwide
microfinance movement that Grameen inspired? If Grameen, one of the best
microfinance organizations, were a bad investment, then there would be little hope for
most of the thousands of others. But Grameen probably was a good investment.
This does not mean that most other microfinance organizations are also good
investments. Although Grameen’s badness would condemn them, Grameen’s goodness
does not necessarily save them. One happy ending does not a microfinance movement
make, and very few organizations perform as well as Grameen. Still, they may be good
investments. Grameen offers hope; it did well, and so might microfinance in general.
Future work should aim to replace hope with knowledge; after all, this paper can only
guess that unmeasured benefits exceed measured costs.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is an inexpensive first step to improve allocations. For
example, average costs may be compared across organizations with similar products,
users, and contexts. All else constant, society prefers suppliers with lower average costs.
Furthermore, although cost-effectiveness analysis does not identify those organizations
with the highest benefits net of costs, it can help to detect grossly inefficient producers.34
The research agenda should also include the measurement of two types of costs
and benefits external to users. The first type of externality affects the family members
or local competitors. The second type of externality accrues worldwide. The best (and
worst) microfinance organizations inspire (and thwart) efforts and budgets far beyond
their own markets and borders. Grameen may be a good social investment for its users,
but no one knows yet whether the microfinance movement that it inspired will turn out
to have been a worthwhile use of scarce funds earmarked for development projects.35
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Table 1: Macroeconomic variables for Bangladesh and U.S.A., 1983-9743
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 Source For the year ended Dec. 31 Line
49.9 40.5 46.7 41.2 27.3 13.5 8.05 5.98 5.07 3.87 2.43 1.80 1.65 1.22 0.01 Data Rev. Lending Ba
12.0 10.0 4.7 6.7 4.4 4.6 4.13 3.55 2.35 1.80 2.24 1.87 1.40 0.63 0.04 Data Rev. investments Bb
11.7 9.2 8.7 6.7 3.9 2.6 1.86 1.44 1.03 0.72 0.47 0.31 0.19 0.10 0.02 Data Exp. Int. deps. Bc
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0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 Data Rev. Other op. Bg
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Data Exp. Other op. Bh
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3.3 0.1 2.8 (0.3) (3.3) (3.0) (2.02) (1.95) (1.87) (1.25) (1.01) (0.62) (0.41) (0.11) (0.40) Bn+Bo+Bp     Net income before taxes, P Bq
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Data Taxes on net income, Tax Br
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Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
Table 2: Adjusted income statement of Grameen, 1983-9744
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 Source For the year ended Dec. 31 Line
107 145 96 86 53 38 40.7 31.1 21.1 14.4 15.1 17.8 10.2 8.5 2.2 Data Cash and short-term invest. Ca
265 236 253 254 234 119 65.1 51.5 45.5 34.8 21.1 12.1 10.2 8.9 4.1 Data Port. (gross) Cb
(13) (12) (13) (13) (11) (5) (2.9) (2.3) (2.1) (1.6) (1.1) (0.6) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) Data Reserve loan losses Cc
252 224 240 242 223 113 62.2 49.2 43.4 33.2 20.0 11.5 9.8 8.5 3.9 Cb+Cc     Port. (net), LP Cd
16 15 14 13 13 11 9.2 7.2 4.9 3.8 2.3 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 Data Fixed assets (net) Ce
0 0 0 0 3 3 5.1 7.2 8.5 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Data Long-term invest. Cf
31 34 44 25 2 3 3.7 7.1 5.1 3.2 5.2 3.3 2.3 1.4 0.2 Data Other assets Cg
406 419 394 365 294 169 121 102 83.1 59.8 42.7 33.8 22.7 18.7 6.4 Ca+Cd+Ce+Cf+Cg     Total Assets Ch
99 87 82 78 69 39 27.1 20.4 15.3 10.8 7.7 4.8 3.4 2.0 1.0 Data Dep. libs Ci
6 11 4 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 2.0 0.6 2.1 0.2 2.0 0.1 0.1 Data Private debt Cj
177 197 195 197 137 48 48.6 49.8 52.0 40.3 31.5 27.8 16.7 15.8 4.6 Data Public debt Ck
40 35 36 27 16 7 4.9 4.6 3.0 2.3 1.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 Data Other Libs. Cl
322 330 318 305 224 96 82.4 76.7 72.4 54.0 43.2 33.5 22.2 17.9 5.8 Ci+Cj+Ck+Cl     Total Libs. Cm
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
Table 3: Adjusted assets and liabilities of Grameen, 1983-9745
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 Source For the year ended Dec. 31 Line
(13.4) (13.4) (16.2) (15.9) (12.6) (9.7) (7.63) (5.68) (3.81) (2.56) (1.55) (0.92) (0.52) (0.40) 0.00 Dc(t-1) Start Retained earnings Da
3.2 0.1 2.8 (0.3) (3.3) (3.0) (2.02) (1.95) (1.87) (1.25) (1.01) (0.62) (0.41) (0.11) (0.40) Bt Change Retained earnings, RE Db
(10.2) (13.4) (13.4) (16.2) (15.9) (12.6) (9.65) (7.63) (5.68) (3.81) (2.56) (1.55) (0.92) (0.52) (0.40) Da+Db     End Retained earnings Dc
(10.6) (8.1) (6.6) (3.8) (1.7) (1.5) (0.99) (0.06) 0.30 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.20 0.00 Df(t-1) Start Reserves and adj. Dd
(4.1) (2.5) (1.5) (2.8) (2.1) (0.3) (0.46) (0.94) (0.35) 0.10 0.04 (0.01) (0.08) 0.03 0.20 Data Change Reserves and adj. De
(14.7) (10.6) (8.1) (6.6) (3.8) (1.7) (1.45) (0.99) (0.06) 0.30 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.20 Dd+De     End Reserves and adj. Df
105.8 91.0 76.3 84.7 83.0 45.6 30.87 13.49 6.83 (0.15) (0.07) (0.30) (0.27) (0.17) 0.00 Di(t-1) Start Equity grants Dg
(4.2) 14.8 14.7 (8.4) 1.7 37.4 14.76 17.37 6.66 6.98 (0.07) 0.22 (0.03) (0.10) (0.17) Data Change Equity grants, EG Dh
101.6 105.8 91.0 76.3 84.7 83.0 45.62 30.87 13.49 6.83 (0.15) (0.07) (0.30) (0.27) (0.17) Dg+Dh     End Equity grants Di
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 Dl(t-1) Start Paid-in cap. public Dj
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 Data Change Paid-in cap. public, PCpub Dk
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Dj+Dk     End Paid-in cap. public Dl
6.0 5.9 5.7 4.1 4.0 3.1 1.97 1.97 1.51 1.02 0.79 0.57 0.37 0.00 0.00 Do(t-1) Start Paid-in cap. private Dm
0.3 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.9 1.14 0.00 0.46 0.49 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.37 0.00 Data Change Paid-in cap. private, PCpri Dn
6.3 6.0 5.9 5.7 4.1 4.0 3.11 1.97 1.97 1.51 1.02 0.79 0.57 0.37 0.00 Dm+Dn     End Paid-in cap. private Do
84.1 88.9 76.4 60.2 70.0 73.6 38.63 25.21 10.73 5.83 (0.50) 0.32 0.51 0.81 0.63 Dc+Df+Di+Dl+Do     Total Equity Dp
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
Table 4: Adjusted equity of Grameen, 1983-9746
Grameen: Discounted outputs
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 Source For the year ended Dec. 31 Line
252 224 240 242 223 113 62.2 49.2 43.4 33.2 20.0 11.5 9.75 8.52 3.92 1.95 Cd Net portfolio outstanding Ea
2,273 2,060 2,066 2,013 1,815 1,424 1,066 870 662 490 339 234 172 121 58.3 30.4 Data Members outstanding (thousands) Eb
27.4 -15.61 -1.516 18.26 110 51.04 13.06 5.711 10.24 13.17 8.508 1.773 1.238 4.598 1.966 NA Ea-Ea(t-1) Change in portfolio in year Ec
213 -6.151 52.53 198.2 390.5 358 196.9 207.3 171.9 151.2 104.8 62.72 50.57 62.73 27.9 NA Eb-Eb(t-1) Change in members in year (thousands) Ed
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 Data Social discount rate, r Ee
0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 1/(1+Ee) Social discount factor, Delta Ef
-0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 ln Ef Natural log of Delta Eg
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Eh(t-1)+1 Year t Eh
0.239 0.263 0.290 0.319 0.350 0.386 0.424 0.467 0.513 0.564 0.621 0.683 0.751 0.826 0.909 1.000 Ef^Eh Delta^t Ei
0.251 0.276 0.304 0.334 0.368 0.405 0.445 0.489 0.538 0.592 0.651 0.717 0.788 0.867 0.954 NA [Ei-Ei(t-1)]/Eg Delta*t Ej
3.64 3.728 3.797 3.842 3.858 3.84 3.779 3.667 3.495 3.253 2.926 2.502 1.964 1.294 0.469 NA Eg^(-2)*{Ei*(Eh*Eg-1)-Ei(t-1)*[(Eh-1)*Eg-1]} Delta**t Ek
59.8 64.2 73.2 77.6 61.6 35.3 24.7 22.6 20.6 15.7 10.2 7.61 7.19 5.36 2.78 NA Ej*(Ea-Eh*Ec)+Ek*Ec Disc. portfolio El
544 570 620 639 594 503 430 374 310 245 186 145 115 77.3 42.1 NA Ej*(Eb-Eh*Ed)+Ek*Ed Disc. members Em
489 429 365 291 214 152 117 92.1 69.5 48.9 33.2 22.9 15.3 8.14 2.78 0 En(t-1)+El Accum. disc. portfolio En
5,394 4,850 4,281 3,661 3,022 2,427 1,924 1,494 1,120 811 566 380 234 119 42.1 0 Eo(t-1)+Em Accum. disc. members (thousands) Eo
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
Table 5: Discounted outputs of Grameen, 1983-9747
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 Source For the year ended Dec. 31 Line
187 196 196 167 92.6 48.2 49.2 50.9 46.2 35.9 29.6 22.2 16.2 10.2 2.30 NA [Ck(t-1)+Ck]/2 Ave. Public debt, D Fa
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 NA Be/Fa Rate paid public debt, c Fb
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 NA Data Market rate for private debt, m Fc
23.4 25.1 25.3 20.9 13.0 7.24 7.43 7.51 6.80 5.29 4.35 2.82 1.66 1.03 0.33 NA Fa*(Fc-Fb)     Disc. public debt, D*(m-c) Fd
3.32 0.07 2.78 (0.26) (3.31) (2.99) (2.02) (1.95) (1.87) (1.25) (1.01) (0.62) (0.41) (0.11) (0.40) NA Bq Net income before taxes, P Fe
2.90 2.44 1.97 1.91 2.25 1.61 1.98 2.20 1.87 1.16 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 NA Bp Rev. grants, RG Ff
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA Bu Disc. op. exp., DX Fg
(22.9) (27.4) (24.5) (23.1) (18.5) (11.8) (11.4) (11.7) (10.5) (7.70) (5.48) (3.44) (2.07) (1.17) (0.74) NA Fe-(Ff+Fd+Fg)     True profit, TP Fh
0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.43 0.51 0.60 0.71 1.00 0 Data Public share of paid-in capital, Beta Fi
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fi0*Dp0 Beta0*E0 Fj
108 103 91.0 78.2 73.4 67.2 48.5 37.7 24.5 16.2 8.27 5.41 3.23 1.94 1.11 0 Fk(t-1)+Ej*(Dh+Dk+Bp+Fd+Bu-Fi*Bs-Br) Accum. disc. fresh funds Fk
107 100.9 89.3 76.7 70.5 63.8 45.9 34.8 23.1 15.2 8.41 5.30 3.01 1.47 0.54 NA Fj+Fk-Fi*Ei*Dp Social cost Fl
19.8 20.8 20.9 20.9 23.3 26.3 23.9 23.3 20.6 18.7 14.9 14.0 12.8 12.3 12.8 NA Fl/(Eo/1000) Social cost/person-year of membership ($) Fm
0.22 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.19 NA Fl/En Social cost/dollar-year of debt ($) Fn
Source: Grameen and calculations of the author. Monetary figures in millions of Dec. 1998 $.
Table 6: Social cost and cost-effectiveness of Grameen, 1983-9748
m
0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0 r
28.0 26.4 24.8 23.2 21.7 20.1 18.5 16.9 15.3 13.8 12.2 10.6 9.0 7.4 5.8 5.1 0.00
28.2 26.7 25.1 23.5 21.9 20.4 18.8 17.2 15.6 14.0 12.5 10.9 9.3 7.7 6.2 5.4 0.02
28.5 26.9 25.3 23.8 22.2 20.6 19.0 17.5 15.9 14.3 12.8 11.2 9.6 8.0 6.5 5.7 0.04
28.7 27.1 25.6 24.0 22.4 20.9 19.3 17.7 16.2 14.6 13.0 11.5 9.9 8.3 6.8 6.0 0.06
29.0 27.4 25.8 24.3 22.7 21.1 19.6 18.0 16.4 14.9 13.3 11.7 10.2 8.6 7.0 6.2 0.08
29.2 27.6 26.1 24.5 22.9 21.4 19.8 18.2 16.7 15.1 13.5 12.0 10.4 8.8 7.3 6.5 0.10
29.4 27.8 26.3 24.7 23.1 21.6 20.0 18.5 16.9 15.3 13.8 12.2 10.6 9.1 7.5 6.7 0.12
29.6 28.1 26.5 24.9 23.4 21.8 20.2 18.7 17.1 15.5 14.0 12.4 10.8 9.3 7.7 6.9 0.14
29.8 28.3 26.7 25.1 23.6 22.0 20.4 18.8 17.3 15.7 14.1 12.6 11.0 9.4 7.9 7.1 0.16
30.0 28.5 26.9 25.3 23.7 22.2 20.6 19.0 17.4 15.9 14.3 12.7 11.1 9.6 8.0 7.2 0.18
30.2 28.6 27.1 25.5 23.9 22.3 20.7 19.2 17.6 16.0 14.4 12.9 11.3 9.7 8.1 7.3 0.20
30.4 28.8 27.2 25.6 24.0 22.5 20.9 19.3 17.7 16.1 14.5 13.0 11.4 9.8 8.2 7.4 0.22
30.5 28.9 27.4 25.8 24.2 22.6 21.0 19.4 17.8 16.2 14.6 13.0 11.4 9.9 8.3 7.5 0.24
30.7 29.1 27.5 25.9 24.3 22.7 21.1 19.5 17.9 16.3 14.7 13.1 11.5 9.9 8.3 7.5 0.26
30.8 29.2 27.6 26.0 24.4 22.8 21.2 19.6 17.9 16.3 14.7 13.1 11.5 9.9 8.3 7.5 0.28
30.9 29.3 27.7 26.1 24.4 22.8 21.2 19.6 18.0 16.4 14.7 13.1 11.5 9.9 8.3 7.5 0.30
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 7: Sensitivity of average cost per person-year of membership